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1. Introduction
Easy-access non-secured consumer loans (instant loans) are a fairly new phenomenon in the Estonian 
credit market. Providers of this variety of product do not have to follow any specifi c regulations. Instant 
loans typically have a short maturity term, the amount generally does not exceed EUR 1,000, and the loans 
are provided by private enterprises not registered as credit institutions.
On account of the rapid advances of technology in recent years, instant-loan providers have been able to 
make it exceptionally easy for anyone to apply for such loans. The providers are open for applications for long 
hours, and often one can apply for a loan simply by sending a text message (SMS) from a previously identi-
fi ed mobile phone. In contrast to operations involving a commercial bank, wherein responding to a loan 
application may take up to fi ve days, providers of instant loans give their answer in minutes. For example, in 
the case of instant-loan provider Credit24*2, the offi ces are open from 8am to 10pm, and a potential client 
who does not have access to electronic channels can simply fi ll in a form in a Maxima supermarket.
The market for instant loans is continuously and rapidly growing, so there are insuffi cient statistics 
describing the current situation. In addition, the overall debt of Estonian households is continuously grow-
ing. Households in Estonia generally do not have experience from previous recessions of how to handle debt-
servicing problems, as household debt was modest until the economic boom of 2004–2007.*3 According 
to the annual survey conducted by TNS Emor, debt-servicing payments by Estonian households increased 
from 2006 to 2009, when 23% of indebted households had a debt-servicing level higher than 30% of their 
disposable income.*4 There are some indirect statistics also, according to which approximately three per 
cent of the total population took out an SMS loan in 2008–2009. One of the debt advisers explained that in 
1 This article is prepared within the framework of the project EMP205, Topical Issues of Consumer Credit in Estonia and 
Norway. The authors are indebted to Heili Püümann, stud. iur., without whom the publication of this article would not have 
been possible. 
2 See its Web page at http://www.credit24.ee/ (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014).
3 K. Staehr, M. Kukk. The over-indebtedness of European households: Updated mapping of the situation, nature and causes, 
effects and initiatives for alleviating its impact. – Country Report Estonia, 19.12.2012, p. 27.
4 Ibid., p. 24. 
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2008–2009 roughly a third of the debt-counselling cases involved clients who had accumulated arrears on 
SMS loans.*5 The Ministry of Finance, however, estimates that at least 100,000 residents (out of Estonia’s 
population of 1.3 million) have obtained instant loans.*6According to information from the register of ‘pay-
ment disorders’ supplied to the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications in October 2013, there 
are 34,047 individuals who have a payment disorder resulting from an instant loan or other consumer 
credit.*7 It has been reported that the number of clients of instant-loan providers is continuously growing 
(mainly in the north-eastern part of Estonia and among the 25–30 and 55–60 age brackets).*8
Regardless of the absence of precise statistical data, one can state that consumer over-indebtedness 
connected with instant loans is currently a very topical matter in Estonia.
This article analyses the current market situation involving instant loans in Estonia and social problems 
related to them. Firstly, the authors provide an overview of the legal issues that have not yet seen full harmonisa-
tion via the European consumer-credit legislation and that are specifi c to thisparticular type of credit product in 
Estonia. Furthermore, the article covers the market situation and estimates related to the credit products active 
in the market and possible numbers of creditors. Because there is no direct supervision of instant-loan provid-
ers, the authors are able to provide only unoffi cial and estimated fi gures characterising the problems. Then, 
the second part of the article provides a legal and institutional overview of the instant-loan market. The third 
and fourth parts describe the consumer-protection measures currently in force in Estonia and assess whether 
those measures have been functioning effi ciently in practice. Finally, the ongoing discussions of further legisla-
tive measures are described and the associated legislative proposals evaluated. 
2. The market situation and statistics
2.1. Overview of the creditors and consumers
Instant-loan providers are not supervised by Estonia’s Financial Supervision Authority (FSA). The FSA 
monitors only credit institutions—that is, entities whose main activities are to give out loans and to accept 
deposits.*9 Since the instant-loan providers do not accept deposits, they are not regarded as credit institu-
tions and hence are not subject to supervision by the FSA. 
The providers of instant loans are regarded as private creditors, and there is no special supervision pro-
vided by law. They are subject only to the monitoring of the Estonian Consumer Protection Board (CPB). 
The CPB follows the Consumer Protection Act*10 (CPA), which, in general, regulates the provision of ser-
vices or sale of products to customers. The CPB has only general supervisory power with respect to loan 
providers, and it does not have the right to intervene in the relationship between the parties to the loan 
contract. Therefore, eventually it is for the courts to decide whether a particular contract between a con-
sumer and a lender is valid or not and whether the lender has the right to claim for payment of the related 
penalties, interest, and additional costs from the customer.
The problems related to instant loans became increasingly topical for the Estonian public in 2004–
2007, when there was a considerable upturn in the instant-loan-provision market. It is remarkable that 
over 2006–2007 the total marketing costs of SMS-loan providers were comparable to the total market-
ing costs of the commercial banks active in Estonia. The extensive promotion of instant loans stopped in 
2008, once default on debts had started to increase amidst global fi nancial crisis. The instant-loan market 
5 Ibid., p. 26. 
6 Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (Majandus- jaKommunikatsiooniministeerium). Kiirlaenu-
turg − analüüs ja ettepanekud [‘The instant-loan market − analysis and proposals’], p. 8. Available at http://www.mkm.ee/
public/kiirlanuturg_analyys_ja_ettepanekud.pdf (most recently accessed on 24.4.2013) (in Estonian).
7 Chancellery of the Riigikogu, department of law and analytics (Riigikogu kantselei õigus- ja analüüsiosakond). Kiirlaenud – 
olemus, probleemid ja reguleerimisvõimalused [‘Fast loans – their nature, problems, and options for regulations’]. – Riigik-
ogu kantselei õigus- ja analüüsiosakond, 21.10.2013 (No. 21). Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/doc.php?177395 (most 
recently accessed on 31.1.2014) (in Estonian).
8 Kiirlaenuturg – analüüs ja ettepanekud (see Note 6), p. 8. 
9 Credit Institutions Act (Krediidiasutusteseadus). – RT I, 23.12.2013, 30 (in Estonian). 
According to §3 (1) of the Credit Institutions Act, a credit institution is a company the principal and permanent economic 
activity of which is to receive cash deposits and other repayable funds from the public and to grant loans for its own account 
and provide other fi nancing.
10 Consumer Protection Act (Tarbijakaitseseadus). – RT I, 31.12.2013, 7 (in Estonian).
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resumed its expansion in 2012–2013. According to publicly available fi nancial reports from the loan provid-
ers, the annual growth of the market has been as great as 50%.*11 Working from data from the register of 
payment disorders, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications assesses the size of the market 
to be approximately EUR 118 million per year and concludes also that the last two years have seen the size 
of that market increase by approximately 30% per year.*12
Because there is neither a registration obligation nor offi cial statistical information about the exact 
number of borrowers, it is only possible to provide some estimated values. The share of electronic retail 
lenders in the retail lending market as a whole is estimated at about 16%.*13 In the assessment of the Minis-
try of Finance, the number of loan providers is approximately 100, but almost 90% of the loans are provided 
by 30 companies*14This leads one to conclude that the instant-loan market is heavily concentrated with a 
few major players. During the period 2010–2012, the six biggest instant loan providers were SMSLaen AS, 
Placet Group OÜ (SMS Money), Folkia AS Eestifi liaal (Monetti), MCM Finance Estonia OÜ (Credit24), 
Hüpoteeklaen OÜ, and MiniCredit AS. In that period, the highest net profi t reported by an instant-loan 
company was EUR 1.5 million.*15 Characteristic of the loan products of the leaders active in this market are 
high interest rates and a high annual percentage rate of charge (APRC); for example, for lending of EUR 
300 to a regular customer of Yes Credit for one month, the APRC is 1355.19%. For lending of the same 
amount from Monetti for a month, the APRC is 791.61% and from SMS-Laen it is 544.64%. In comparison, 
the APRC for a 2,000-euro loan for four years from the bank SEB is approximately 18.54%.
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications has conducted interviews with debt counsellors 
in order to create a profi le of an average instant-loan client. Consumer-credit debt is a problem mostly for 
people who have a lower level of education; debtors with a higher education are a very rare phenomenon. 
The majority of the debtors are unemployed, benefi ciaries of subsistence funding, or persons receiving 
pension due to incapacity for work. The main reasons for taking out an instant loan are need to cover sub-
sistence expenses, need to buy necessities, and need to cover other debts. As an alarming trend the debt 
counsellors note many young people applying for instant loans while in an intoxicated state at parties.*16
2.2. Products on the market
Instant-loan providers offer several distinct credit products: instant loans, SMS loans, loans for small sums, 
and other consumer loans. These other consumer loans too, such as those involving traditional credit cards, 
qualify as non-secured loans, but some of the requirements involved in application for those traditional 
products differ from those applicable for the other products mentioned. An ‘instant loan’ is characterised 
by its short duration and small amount. Often, an application for an instant loan can be submitted via the 
Internet. 
An SMS loan is a type of instant loan that can be applied for through sending of a message by SMS to the 
provider.*17 Until the beginning of 2008, instant-loan providers in Estonia were allowed to identify custom-
ers without direct contact with them (for example, through a bank link). Since concerns about malpractice 
were serious, the law was amended in early 2008*18; under the regulations now in effect, the applicant has 
to be identifi ed by the lender at least once in person*19. This amendment to the law was a fi rst step toward 
more responsible practices in electronic retail lending. After its adoption, most lenders implemented some 
changes of procedure, usually arranging things such that the fi rst-time identifi cation is done either in the 
11 M. Kukk. What do we know about SMS loans / fast loans in Estonia? Tallinn University of Technology, 17.9.2013.
12 Kiirlaenuturg – analüüs ja ettepanekud (see Note 6), p. 3. 
13 Ibid., p. 7.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., p. 5. 
16 Ibid., pp. 13–14.
17 See further discussion of these modern credit products in K. Saare et al. Protection of consumer rights in SMS loan agree-
ments. – European Review of Private Law, 2010/18, pp. 129–131.
18 I. Ulst. Balancing the Rights of Consumers and Service Providers in Electronic Retail Lending in Estonia. Tartu Ülikooli 
Kirjastus 2011, p. 21.
19 The Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Prevention Act (Rahapesu ja terrorismi rahastamise tõkestamise seadus). – 
RT I, 8.5.2012, 5 (in Estonian).
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offi ce of the lender or by means of a courier service.*20 The government has now recommenced discussion 
regarding possible additional amendments to the regulations, and various analyses are being carried out by 
individual ministries. 
Several instant-loan providers offer some unusual kinds of credit products, such as a loan that a person 
can be granted in cash. Getting the amount in cash has two ‘advantages’. Firstly, if the creditor pays out the 
loan in cash, there will be no record of it on the consumer’s bank statement. That element is very impor-
tant with regard to confi dentiality. Under the usual bank practices*21 in Estonia, it is diffi cult for a person 
to get credit from a commercial bank if having taken out an instant loan. Before the ‘loan in cash’ product 
appeared on the market, some consumers were hesitant to obtain an instant loan because they were aware 
of the problems that could occur in the future upon application for a loan from a bank. In contrast, there 
were no problems related to signing the ‘loan in cash’ contract: the product offers full confi dentiality and 
allows clients to get an instant loan ‘without consequences’. Secondly, a loan of this type can be taken out 
even by a person whose bank account has been seized by the bailiff, with all the payments to that account 
being applied directly for repayment of previous debts. If the loan is paid out in cash, the person receives it 
regardless of bank-account status.
On account of the number of instant-loan providers in Estonia, a Web site*22 has been developed in a 
commercial initiative to allow clients to obtain a better overview of the various creditors. That site offers a 
possibility to get acquainted with all possible creditors and the loan products on the market. The Web site also 
gives potential clients an opportunity to submit requests to all of the creditors and compare the offers before 
choosing one. On one hand, this gives potential clients the opportunity to get a comprehensive overview of 
all possible products and to fi nd the best offer; on the other hand, Web sites of this sort are another way for 
instant-loan providers to advertise their products and promote the understanding that credit is easily avail-
able. 
3. Legal and institutional overview
3.1. Legal overview
The framework regulation that is binding for consumer credit can be divided into administrative measures 
and contractual measures. Supervision of administrative measures is exercised by the CPB and, in cases 
of disagreement, by administrative courts. The contractual measures can be implemented by the parties 
through actions in civil courts. 
The administrative measures are regulated mainly by the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and the 
Advertising Act (AA).*23 The CPA regulates the offering, sale, and marketing of goods or services to con-
sumers by traders; specifi es the rights of consumers as purchasers or users of goods or services in general; 
and provides for the organisation and supervision of consumer protection and liability for violations. The 
aim with the AA is to restrict the advertising activity of the creditors and reduce the likelihood of the loan 
providers creating an illusion of easy money. If consumer credit is granted by a credit institution, the provi-
sions of the Credit Institutions Act (CIA) too are binding for the relevant creditor.
The contractual aspects of credit transactions are regulated by the Law of Obligations Act (LOA)*24, 
among them the norms implementing the EU Consumer Credit Directive (CCD)*25. The unconscionability 
doctrine under which usurious credit contracts are restricted can be found in the General Part of the Civil 
Code Act (GPCCA)*26. The procedural aspects of enforcing the claims arising from consumer-credit contracts 
are to a great extent set forth in the Civil Procedure Code (CPC).*27 It must be stressed that the order-for-
20 I. Ulst (see Note 18), p. 21.
21 For example, leading banks in Estonia SEB and Swedbank.
22 See http://www.parimintress.ee/ or http://www.heaintress.ee/ (most recently accessed on 26.2.1014).
23 Advertising Act (Reklaamiseadus). – RT I, 11.6.2013, 6 (in Estonian).
24 Law of Obligations Act (Võlaõigusseadus). – RT I, 8.7.2011, 21 (in Estonian).
25 Directive 2008/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on credit agreements for consumers 
and repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, OJ L 133/66, 22.5.2008.
26 General Part of the Civil Code Act (Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus). – RT I, 6.12.2010, 12 (in Estonian).
27 Civil Procedure Code (Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik). – RT I, 22.3.2013, 16 (in Estonian).
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payment procedure is used extensively by creditors*28. It is common practice for instant-loan providers to 
use this procedure for asserting their claims against consumers: according to the statistics of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs andCommunications, 80% of all claims related to instant loans are asserted via the order-
for-payment procedure.*29 It is a faster and less expensive procedure for the claimant than others, as it is 
implemented without court hearings. Notifi cation about the claim and a debt-repayment proposal are sent 
to the debtor by post. If the debtor does not respond, the court decides on the debt-enforcement measures to 
be applied, without the debtor’s involvement. The amounts that are claimed in court can substantially exceed 
that of the initial loan. 
A third group of relevant regulations come into play, to do with the results of consumer over-indebt-
edness. In the event of insolvency of a private person or a household, there is a possibility for bankruptcy 
proceedings or restructuring of debts. In 2011, the Debt Restructuring and Debt Protection Act (DRDPA)*30 
entered into force, with the intent being to offer alternatives to bankruptcy for indebted individuals. The 
DRDPA stipulates that natural persons can turn to the courts to apply for restructuring of personal debts 
for purposes of overcoming the solvency problems and avoiding bankruptcy. The debtor has to provide a 
sustainable debt-restructuring plan demonstrating ability to pay at least some of the debt due. The debtor 
has to cover all the associated costs, including the court fees and the costs of the advisory service. The aim 
with the DRDPA was to offer natural persons with temporary payment issues a possibility to restructure the 
debt and to help them through solvency problems*31; however, in practice, the protection provided by the 
DRDPA seems not to be suffi cient. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Justice, from April 2009 to 
November 2013 only 102 restructuring applications were fi led with the courts, 92 of which have proceeded 
to processing. Of the applications processed, only seven were fully or partially approved by the court.*32
The Bankruptcy Act*33 (BA), from 2004, provides a possibility for natural person to commence bank-
ruptcy proceedings and eventually be released from the debts.*34 In general, the rules of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings for a natural person are similar to those applicable to the equivalent proceedings for legal per-
sons*35, with the main difference being that for natural persons the law provides for debt-release procedure. 
At the request of a debtor, the court can decide on the release of said debtor from his or her obligations 
that were not performed during the bankruptcy proceedings by a ruling fi ve years after commencement of 
proceedings for the release of the debtor from his or her obligations (see §175 (1) of the BA). Taking into 
account the circumstances the court may release a debtor who has been performing his or her obligations 
duly from his or her obligations of even earlier but not before three years have passed from commencement 
of the proceedings (again, see §175 (1)1 of the BA).
3.2. Institutional overview
Since instant-loan providers are not credit institutions, their business practices are neither standardised 
nor regulated as those of credit institutions are. They are not obliged to disclose any specifi c information 
describing their activities to a supervisor, and they are bound only by general business regulations.
The majority of the instant-loan providers do not fall under the jurisdiction of the FSA. Therefore, 
the only relevant supervisory authority is the CPB, under whose jurisdiction falls supervision of the fulfi l-
ment of the CPA and the AA. According to the AA, the CPB has the right to supervise the compliance of 
28 Section 481 et seq. of the Civil Procedure Code. The procedure is similar to the order-for-payment procedure under Regula-
tion (EC) No 1896/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council creating a European order for payment procedure. 
OJ L 399, 30.12.2006, pp. 1–32.
29 Kiirlaenuturg- analüüs ja ettepanekud (see Note 6), p. 13.
30 Debt Restructuring and Debt Protection Act (Võlgade ümberkujundamise ja võlakaitse seadus). – RT I, 6.12.2010, 1 (in 
Estonian).
31 Võlgade ümberkujundamise ja võlakaitse seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri [‘Explanatory memorandum on the Debt Restructur-
ing and Debt Protection Act]. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems2&emshelp=true&eid=100409
5&u=20140130162250 (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014) (in Estonian).
32 Statistics provided by the Ministry of Justice that are related to implementing of the Debt Restructuring and Debt Protection 
Act. Statistics as of 2013 (the above-mentioned statistics are in the possession of the authors).
33 Bankruptcy Act (Pankrotiseadus). – RT I, 23.12.2013, 54 (in Estonian).
34 Chapter 11 of the BA.
35 M. Varusk. Füüsilise isiku pankrotimenetlus [‘Bankruptcy proceedings for natural persons’]. Available at http://www.just.
ee/49515 31.01.2014 (most recently accessed on 26.2.2014) (in Estonian).
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advertising with the requirements specifi ed by law. In its supervision, the CPB has the right to check the 
compliance of advertising with the require ments set by the law (see §31 (1) 1) of the AA), issue oral warnings 
to the person who commissioned certain advertising and the advertiser or the producer of the advertise-
ment in question, and draw said persons’ attention to any failure to comply with the requirements of the AA 
(see §31 (1) 5) of the AA). 
The CPB is also entitled to issue guidelines of an advisory nature—i.e., non-binding recommenda tions. In 
2012, the CPB issued advisory guidelines for consumer-credit providers,*36 in which it explained the obli-
gations of responsible lending and laid down some rules for implementation of the reasonable lending 
principle. 
4. Measures
4.1. Administrative measures
4.1.1. Licensing
There are currently no licensing measures or regulations in place for instant-loan providers under Estonian 
law, as the licensing system and supervision by the FSA are applicable only to credit institutions. However, 
during recent discussions the question has been raised of whether imposing licensing requirement could 
have a positive infl uence on the instant-credit market. Even the Supreme Court has stressed that the legisla-
tor should introduce more stringent administrative control requirements for the consumer-credit provid-
ers*37 and currently the Ministry of Finance is working on a legal proposal introducing licensing require-
ments also to creditors other than banks.
Indeed, if instant-loan providers were obliged to have a licence, it would be possible to exercise more 
effi cient supervision of them. This would aid in getting a better overview of the situation with instant-loan 
providers and statistics on them. Licensing measures could also offer the possibility to establish minimum 
requirements for operation (e.g., a minimum threshold for equity capital and requirements for members of 
the management board). Last but not least, the possibility of losing the licence would motivate the creditors 
to comply with the requirements for responsible lending practices.
4.1.2. Marketing restrictions
Estonian law sets some specifi c restrictions on advertising of fi nancial services and some general require-
ments for marketing that also have an impact on the instant-loan market. In 2013, the legislator introduced 
additional provisions to the AA on advertising of fi nancial services. One of the major problems connected 
with instant loans (and non-secured consumer credit in general) is that in their advertisements credi-
tors create an illusion that lending is extremely easy and will even resolve personal fi nancial problems.*38 
Recently, one of the most common commercial practices among many instant-loan creditors has been mar-
keting the fi rst loan as ‘free’: if taking out a loan under certain conditions (amount limits and conditions as 
to the time period), the consumer is obliged to repay only the principal amount of the loan later. The main 
purpose of that kind of practice is to attract new clients and to create a positive experience of the service.
The advertising restrictions—both general ones and those specifi c to fi nancial services—are regulated 
in the AA. Under a general principle of the AA, advertising that in any way misleads or is likely to mislead 
the persons to whom it is directed or whom it reaches and that, by reason of its misleading nature, is likely 
to affect their economic behaviour or that, for those reasons, injures or is likely to injure a competitor of the 
person placing the advertising is prohibited. In accordance with the AA, therefore, an advertisement that 
36 Tarbijakaitseamet (Consumer Protection Board). Juhend tarbijakrediidi pakkujatele ja vahendajatele [‘Advisory guidelines 
for consumer-credit providers and retailers’], 22.11.2012 Available at http://www.tarbijakaitseamet.ee/sites/default/fi les/
failid/dokumendid/juhend_krediidiandjatele_vastutustundlik_laenamine_.pdf (most recently accessed on 30.1.2014) (in 
Estonian). 
37 CCSCd 5.3.2014, 3-2-1-186-13, paragraph 25 (in Estonian).
38 For example, the advertisement from the Web page http://www.parimintress.ee/ ‘After a long postponement of visiting the 
dentist, I decided to borrow the absent money and fi nally got my teeth repaired. Thanks to the Web site parimintress.ee, I 
found a very favourable loan, and I am truly grateful to them for that’.
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creates an impression that the non-secure easy-access loan is an easy solution for fi nancial problems and 
has no serious consequences is prohibited.
In May 2013, an amendment was made to §29 (1) of the AA such that the rules on advertising by credit 
institutions are now extended to non-secured easy-access loan creditors. According to §29 (2) of the AA, 
an advertisement of fi nancial services must include an invitation to examine the terms and conditions of 
the fi nancial services and to consult an expert, if necessary. Any advertisement in which consumer credit is 
offered or the arrangement of consumer-credit contracts is offered must indicate the annual percentage rate 
of charge by way of a representative example (under §29 (3) of the AA). Further, an advertisement offering 
credit to a consumer has to be responsible, and the advertiser is not allowed to create an illusion that tak-
ing out consumer credit is risk-free and an easy solution to fi nancial problems. Any advertisement in which 
consumer credit is offered or the arrangement of consumer-credit contracts is offered has to be responsible 
and balanced, and it may not suggest that consumer credit is a risk-free and simple opportunity to solve 
fi nancial problems or induce consumers to ill-advised borrowing (see §29 (7) of the AA). The information 
shall be presented in such a typeface and font size as, given ordinary attention, make it noticeable, under-
standable, and clearly distinguishable from other information. 
According to the explanatory memorandum on the above-mentioned amendments to the AA, their goal 
is to prevent fi nancial services from being advertised in a way that leads the consumer to take out credit 
unwisely.*39 Responsible and balanced advertising also means that information about possibilities and pur-
poses of using the loan should not overshadow the information on the obligations and responsibilities that 
follow from using the consumer credit. 
In a general requirement under the CPA, unfair and misleading commercial practices are prohibited 
(see §12, items 2 and 3 of the CPA). An unfair commercial practice is a practice that is contrary to good 
commercial usage. A commercial practice is misleading if it employs false information or if presentation of 
factually correct information deceives or is likely to deceive the average consumer and, in consequence of 
it, the average consumer makes a transaction decision that he or she would not have made otherwise or is 
likely to do so. So far, there is no Supreme Court case law related to misleading or unfair commercial prac-
tices in relation to credit transactions.
The CPB has the right to issue, within the limits of its competence, advisory guidelines on compli-
ance with the requirements arising from legislation for consumer protection. In 2013, the CPB exercised 
this right and issued guidelines for application of the fi nancial-service advertisement requirements that 
were designed to specify the defi nition of advertisement and fi nancial services. For example, in a situation 
wherein the client has not asked for an offer of fi nancial services, a ‘personal offer’ is to be considered an 
advertisement.*40 Another aim with the guidelines is to specify the law’s restrictions on the advertisement 
of fi nancial services*41, such as the obligation to publish a representative example. The service provider, 
when preparing a representative example through application of its best professional skills on the basis of 
the statistics and/or practice of the company, is responsible for classifi cation of credit contracts and the 
authenticity of the data used.*42
According to the statistics provided by the CPB, that board has conducted 54 sets of proceedings in 2011 
related to advertisement of fi nancial services. Violation of the law has been asserted 24 times. In 2010, the 
board carried out 38 sets of proceedings related to advertisement of fi nancial services and violations were 
asserted in 17 cases.*43
One can conclude that restrictions related to advertisements are relatively effi cient measures 
against the illusion of ‘easy money’. It is more doubtful, however, whether the obligatory information in 
39 Võlaõigusseaduse ja reklaamiseaduse muutmise seletuskiri [‘Explanatory memorandum on the Act Amending the Law of Obli-
gations Act and Advertising Act]. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?op=ems&page=eelnou&eid=7df3d370-3b77-4c0b-
be6b-c73fffd0242b& (most recently accessed on 18.1.2014) (in Estonian).
40 Tarbijakaitseamet (Consumer Protection Board). Guidelines for compliance with the requirements arising from legisla-
tion for consumer protection, 12.9.2013. Available at http://www.tarbijakaitseamet.ee/sites/default/fi les/failid/dokumendid/
guidelines_for_application_of_the_fi nancial_service_advertisement_requirements-enters_into_force_01_12_2013.pdf 
(most recently accessed on 4.6.2014), p. 5.
41 Ibid., p. 6.
42 Ibid., p. 8. 
43 Tarbijakaitseamet (Consumer Protection Board). Tarbijakaitseameti aastaraamat 2012 [‘Yearbook of the Consumer Pro-
tection Board 2012’]. Available at http://www.tarbijakaitseamet.ee/en/node/304 (most recently accessed on 30.1.2014) (in 
Estonian).
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a fi nancial-service advertisement really is able to ensure that an average reasonable person actually can 
understand the possible risks of an instant-loan contract. Recently during the political debate the question 
has been raised whether to ban the advertising of consumer loans in TV and radio all in all but the debate 
is still ongoing.
4.1.3. The system of debt-counselling
Debt-counselling as a public social service is not generally available in Estonia. However, there are three 
types of debt-counselling systems. 
On the Web page created by the FSA, there is an interactive ‘debt-counselling’ application that helps a 
debtor to analyse his or her situation.*44 The problem with Internet counselling is that it is not direct, it does 
not take into account the person’s actual situation, and many people may not have access to the Internet. 
The second category of debt-counselling involves NGOs offering counselling services on their own ini-
tiative and on their own conditions. There is no state supervision of these organisations, and the network of 
institutions is developed arbitrarily. 
In a very limited extent, there are also debt-counselling services offered by the state and by the local 
governments. The Estonian Unemployment Insurance Fund offers personal counselling for unemployed 
persons with the purpose of helping the unemployed back to the labour market.*45 One part of their per-
sonal counselling encompasses debt-counselling if necessary. In order to obtain such debt-counselling, the 
person has to be unemployed. In a one-time programme, the Ministry of Social Affairs also has carried out 
debt-counselling for persons who are not recorded as unemployed, but such programmes are rather excep-
tional.
Some local governments too provide debt-counselling as a part of their social services. One of the most 
successful of these is the local government of Tallinn, which has created the Tallinn Social Work Centre, 
whose services include debt-counselling. The service is aimed at individuals who have their registered 
domicile in Tallinn, and the counselling is offered free of charge. Since 2008, the Social Work Centre has 
been offering debt-counselling also to persons who are not residents of Tallinn, but in those cases the fee 
for the service is 19 EUR.*46 If the debtor is directed to the Tallinn Social Work Centre by some other local 
government, the cost might be covered by that local government.
In conclusion one can state that debt-counselling service is not available as a general social service in 
Estonia. Therefore, the system of debt-counselling is not harmonised and is case-specifi c. The most acces-
sible route to help is to use interactive debt-counselling Web sites. The indebted person also has the oppor-
tunity to utilise the help of NGOs, but there is no actual public supervision of these institutions. Debt-
counselling organised by the state or local government is not systematic.
4.1.4. The credit register
Only a privately held negative credit register exists in Estonia. The register is maintained by a public lim-
ited company, AS Krediidiinfo, as one of its publicly available business services (the register of payment 
disorders). Under Estonian law, apart from general data-protection rules*47, there is no special regulation 
on dissemination of debtors’ data. 
The register of payment disorders was created back in 2001 as a co-operation project of commercial 
banks in Estonia with the aim of offering creditors the possibility to make reasonable and appropriate credit 
decisions and also to help creditors to apply the reasonable lending principle. The register contains data of 
both natural persons and legal persons. The data are obtained from the users of the register or from other 
creditors. Information about when and on what grounds the debt arose, when the obligation ended, and the 
approximate amount of the debt is held in the register.
44 Võlanõustaja [‘Debt counsellor’].Available at http://volanoustamine.minuraha.ee/fi les/v6lan6ustamine.pdf (most recently 
accessed on 31.1.2014) (in Estonian).
45 Tööturuteenused ja toetused [‘Labour market services and benefi ts’]. Available at http://www.sm.ee/tegevus/too-ja-toime-
tulek/tooturuteenused-ja-toetused.html (most recently accessed on 31.1.2014) (in Estonian).
46 The Tallinn Social Work Centre on the Internet: http://www.swcenter.ee/ (most recently accessed on 18.1.2014) (in Estonian).
47 Personal Data Protection Act (Isikuandmete kaitse seadus). – RT I, 30.12.2010, 11 (in Estonian).
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A payment disorder is entered in the public register when debt has arisen from breach of contract and 
not been settled within 45 days. The amount of the debt has to be at least EUR 30, inclusive of interest and 
the penalty for late payment. If a person has many separate debts, the register shows the balance of the 
debts. The balance of a debt is updated in line with the actual amount of debt. An active payment disorder 
will be removed from the register when all obligations that have arisen in relation to the contract are ful-
fi lled, but information about previous debts entered in the register remains there after the debt is paid. The 
information on previous payment disorders remains available for seven years in cases of legal persons and 
three years for natural persons.*48 Exceptionally, the payment disorders of natural persons that are entered 
in the register by banks will, according to the internal rules of the register, be available for fi ve years.*49 
Inserting data in the Krediidiinfo database presumes that the creditor has a contract with AS Krediidiinfo 
and that the contract that is the basis for the debt allows the lender to forward the data to the register of 
payment disorders. The consumer’s consent is usually obtained via the standard terms. The information 
about legal persons is publicly available for everyone, but obtaining access to the information about private 
persons requires one to have a legitimate interest.*50
There has been some discussion about the need for creating a positive credit register—i.e., a register 
that would include all the credit information, total income of private persons, and obligations that are 
offi cially registered. It is argued that a positive credit register would offer a possibility to focus on actual 
creditworthiness and its sustainability by the applicant.*51 The greatest impact of use of a positive credit 
register would probably be a decrease in the credit risk for creditors. It would also aid in implementation of 
the principle of responsible lending. It is suggested that a positive credit register would help to decrease the 
amount of unpaid loans: surveys by the World Bank Group and comparison of Estonia with other countries 
suggest that a positive credit register could decrease unpaid loans by 50% and consumer loans’ interest by 
about 30%.*52 On the other hand, creation of a positive register raises privacy concerns, and there has not 
yet been a political decision on this issue
4.1.5. The principle of responsible lending
The principle of responsible lending and the obligations arising therefrom are mostly a result of implemen-
tation of the Consumer Credit Directive, although for credit institutions an obligation to assess a prospec-
tive borrower’s creditworthiness was introduced back in 2007 in §83 (3) of the CIA. The main obligations 
related to the responsible lending principle are provided by the LOA and AA. The principle of responsible 
lending is not defi ned in Estonian law but can be described in terms of the various obligations of the credi-
tor in the pre-contractual phase. The main obligations related to responsible lending are the obligation 
to acquire information that gives the creditor the possibility of assessing the creditworthiness of the cus-
tomer, judge creditworthiness, and give the consumer suffi cient information to enable him or her to assess 
whether the proposed consumer-credit contract corresponds to his or her needs and fi nancial situation 
(under §4032  (1) of the LOA). The burden of proof of compliance with those obligations lies with the credi-
tor (see §4032 (7) of the LOA).
In assessment of the creditworthiness of a consumer, the creditor should adhere to due diligence and 
take into consideration all the circumstances known to the creditor that may have an impact on the con-
sumer’s ability to repay the credit under the terms and conditions agreed upon in the contract, including the 
consumer’s fi nancial situation, regular income, other fi nancial obligations, performance of earlier payment 
obligations, and the impact of a potential increase in the fi nancial obligations arising from the consumer-
credit contract, by means of determining the extent of the required assessment operations in light of the 
48 Ibid., §6 (11). 
49 Eraisiku maksehäirete sisestamine [‘Recording of the payment disorders of private persons’]. Available at http://www.
krediidiinfo.ee/index.php?m=365 (most recently accessed on 25.2.2014) (in Estonian).
50 Eraisiku maksehäirete vaatamine [‘Examining the payment disorders of private persons’]. Available at http://www.kredii-
diinfo.ee/index.php?m=301 (most recently accessed on 25.2.2014) (in Estonian).
51 K. Saar. Positiivne krediidiregister teeb laenud odavamaks [‘The positive credit register decreases the cost of credit’]. − 
Äripäev, 15.10.2013. Available at http://www.aripaev.ee/?PublicationId=31503ED6-39D4-4163-9D98-74AA1E3959CE&p
aperarticleid=BBA4330D-3E54-433F-A3A9-2C0FCE5350AF (most recently accessed on 25.2.2014) (in Estonian).
52 Ibid. See also: Krediidiinfo. Eraisikute krediidiregistri võimalikkusest Eestis [‘On the possibility of a credit register for pri-
vate persons’], 12.11.2012. Available at http://blog.krediidiinfo.ee/2012/11/eraisikute-krediidiregistri-voimalikkusest-eestis/ 
(most recently accessed on 25.2.2014) (in Estonian).
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terms and conditions of the consumer-credit contract, the consumer data available, and the amount of the 
fi nancial commitment undertaken (see §4032 (2) of the LOA). 
Both the FSA and the CPB have issued guidelines on implementation of the responsible lending prin-
ciple. According to the guidelines of the FSA, the credit institution should assess whether the customer 
would be able to repay the loan from his or her income/salary and whether the customer’s income will be 
viable in the future. Viability of repaying the loan means that the customer is able to pay back the loan out of 
his or her salary or savings without the need to liquidate the collateral.*53 The CPB too has emphasised the 
importance of viable lending. According to the CPB’s guidelines, the creditor has to take the credit decision 
primarily on the basis of the viability of paying.*54
In 2010, the CPB received 692 consumer complaints related to consumer credit. The number for 2011 
was 572.*55 The main reason for an injunction on consumer-credit providers was related to hardly under-
standable legal language in the standard terms and unreasonably high fees for premature termination of the 
contract. Statistics show that the complaints received by CPB in 2010 related to the principle of responsible 
lending and has detected 30 fi nancial-service providers who failed to meet the responsible lending require-
ments.*56
In the explanatory memorandum on the act implementing the Consumer Credit Directive, it is stated 
that the lender has the obligation to assess the client’s fi nancial situation during the counselling on the 
loan.*57 In §4032 (1) of the LOA, the legislator has clearly connected Subsection 6 and Article 8 of the 
Consumer Credit Directive with each other, as a result of which it can be presumed that the legislator has 
foreseen the consumer’s counselling in accordance with his or her creditworthiness.*58 In Estonian law, 
the obligations of the parties arising from the responsible lending principle are regulated as part of the 
pre-contractual obligations, with the goal of minimising the information asymmetry between the parties.*59
It has to be taken into account that, according to the law, the consumer has to receive enough explana-
tions. What is enough is not defi ned in the law and has to be determined case-specifi cally. The extent of 
the explanations is dependent upon the consumer, the conditions of the offer, and the complexity of the 
terms and conditions.*60 According to the guidelines of the Consumer Protection Board, the scope of the 
explanations depends on the specifi c credit product and on the previous experience of the consumer. The 
creditor is obliged to clarify the consumer’s need and wish to get more information about the contract. It is 
not allowed for the creditor to encourage the consumer not to submit information that is necessary for the 
process of evaluating consumercreditworthiness. Also, the possibility of asking questions and getting suf-
fi cient answers from the creditor has to be ensured for the client.*61
If the credit provider does not honour the obligations specifi ed by law, the Consumer Protection Board 
can issue a prescription as to how the practice of the creditor should be changed (see §41 (1), item 1 of the 
CPA). According to § 23 (4) of the Law Enforcement Act*62 that is in force since 01 July 2014 the upper limit 
of possible penalty payment is 9600 euros .This is remarkably higher than the 640 euros that was the upper 
limit until the recent amendments.
53 Finantsinspektsiooni soovituslik juhend [‘Recommended guidelines of the Financial Supervision Authority’]. Vastutus-
tundliku laenamise nõuded [‘Requirements on responsible lending’], p. 5. Available at http://www.fi .ee/public/Soovitus-
lik_juhend_Vastutustundlik_laenamine.pdf (most recently accessed on 18.1.2014) (in Estonian).
54 Tarbijakaitseamet (see Note 36).
55 Tarbijakaitseamet (the Consumer Protection Board). Tarbijakaitseameti aastaraamat 2011 [‘Yearbook of the Consumer 
Protection Board 2011’], p. 10.Available at http://www.tarbijakaitseamet.ee/en/node/304 (most recently accessed on 
30.1.2014) (in Estonian).
56 Tarbijakaitseamet (see Note 43), p. 14.
57 Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse seletuskiri [‘Explanatory memorandum on the act implement-
ing the Consumer Credit Directive’], p. 26. Available at http://www.riigikogu.ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems&emshelp=true&e
id=1033413&u=20110306003000 (most recently accessed on 18.1.2014) (in Estonian).
58 Ibid., p. 26.
59 K. Koll. Vastutustundliku laenamise põhimõte [‘The principle of responsible lending’]. Available at http://www.just.ee/orb.
aw/class=fi le/action=preview/id=55659/Kristiina+Koll.+Vastutustundliku+laenamise+p%F5him%F5te.pdf (most recently 
accessed on 18.1.2014) (in Estonian).
60 Võlaõigusseaduse ja teiste seaduste muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri (see Note 57), p. 26.
61 Tarbijakaitseamet (see Note 36), Section 7.
62 Law Enforcement Act (Korrakaitseseadus) - RT I, 22.03.2011, 4 (in Estonian).
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In the legal literature, it is argued that the principle of responsible lending does not oblige the creditor to 
refrain from giving credit to a non-creditworthy consumer.*63 Neither does such an obligation follow from 
the wording of §4032 of the LOA. However, the Supreme Court has referred in a recent decision to the credi-
tor being obliged to refrain from giving credit in cases wherein ‘it should have been obvious to the creditor 
that extension of the loan term for an additional fee would only increase the debt’.*64 The Supreme Court 
stated that ‘if the creditor had implemented the principle of responsible lending, the plaintiff would have 
not entered into contract with the creditor and could have avoided the increase of debt’.*65 Accordingly, it 
seems that the interpretation of the Supreme Court moved beyond the wording of the LOA with the conclu-
sion that the creditor must refrain from granting credit in situations wherein the non-creditworthiness of 
the consumer is obvious.
5. Contractual measures
5.1. The unconscionability doctrine and relative APRC restrictions
In 2009, the Estonian legislator tried to solve the problems arising out of usurious practices of instant-
loan providers through a legislative amendment setting forth a relative APRC cap in combination with the 
unconscionability doctrine. Before that, the prevailing view in court practice was that the parties are free 
to agree upon the interest rate of a loan and, therefore, an unproportionally high interest rate does not, in 
itself, entail violation of ‘good morals’.*66 Thus a usurious credit contract could not be considered automati-
cally void under §86 of the GPCCA. The position taken by the Supreme Court before 2009 was that such a 
contract can, as a rule, only be avoidable under §97 of the GPCCA if the consumer is able to prove that 1) he 
or she concluded the agreement under extremely unfavourable conditions, 2) he or she did so because of 
gross disparity (inexperience, urgent needs, etc.), and 3) the other party benefi ted from the gross dispari-
ty.*67 In the legal literature one could also fi nd the view that in electronic credit transactions wherein the 
creditor does not assess the creditworthiness of the borrower, there should also be a possibility to consider 
a usurious credit contract void through breach of ‘good morals’ under §86 of the GPCCA.*68 In practice, 
though, this norm was never applied and credit agreements with high interest costs were held to be valid by 
the courts.
In February 2009, the Estonian Parliament passed a legislative amendment, affecting §86 of the 
GPCCA, with a purpose of ‘reducing the social problems related to the rapid development of the instant-
consumer-credit market’.*69 It was admitted that the legal rules in effect at the time were not able to solve 
those problems in accordance with the social needs and the society’ssense of justice.*70 The amendment 
entered into force on 1 May 2009 and changed the notion of a transaction violating ‘good morals’. The aim 
with the new wording of §86 of the GPCCA was to ensure that usurious credit contracts can be considered 
to be against good morals and hence void. 
The new §86 (2) of the GPCCA stipulates that a transaction is deemed contrary to good morals if, inter 
alia, one party knew or had to know that the other party entered into the transaction because of urgent 
needs, said person’s dependence or inexperience, or similar circumstances and if 1) the transaction was 
made on grossly unfair terms for the other party or 2) imbalance in the value of the mutual obligations of the 
63 K. Sein. Protection of consumers in consumer-credit contracts: Expectations and reality in Estonia. – Juridica International 
2013, p. 37.
64 CCSCd 19.02.2014 3-2-1-169-13, paragraph 21 (in Estonian).
65 Ibid.
66 See CCSCd 22.10.2002 3-2-1-108-02; CCSCd 16.10.2002 3-2-1-80-02; CCSCd 29.01.2007 3-2-1-137-06. See also K. Saare 
et al. (see Note 17), pp. 136–137.
67 CCSCd 22.10.2002 3-2-1-108-02, paragraph 11 (in Estonian).  
68 P. Varul et al. Võlaõigusseadus II. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [‘Law of Obligations Act II: Commented Edition’]. Tallinn: 
Juura 2007, pp. 391–392.
69 Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seaduse ja võlaõigusseaduse muutmise seaduse eelnõu seletuskiri [‘Explanatory memorandum on 
the Act Amending the General Part of the Civil Code Act and Law of Obligations Act’]. Available at http://www.riigikogu.
ee/?page=eelnou&op=ems2&emshelp=true&eid=420369&u=20130411155159 (most recently accessed on 10.4.2013) (in 
Estonian).
70 Ibid.
Karin Sein, Urmas Volens
Legal Problems and Regulations related to Easy-access Non-secured Consumer Loans in Estonia
131JURIDICA INTERNATIONAL 22/2014
parties exists and can be deemed contrary to good morals. In order to ease the consumer’s burden of proof, 
the second sentence of §86 (3) of the GPCCA stipulates that in the case of consumer-credit contracts it is 
assumed that the value of the parties’ mutual obligations is disproportionate and contrary to good morals 
if, inter alia, at the time of issuing of the loan the APRC payable by the consumer is more than three times 
the average APRC charged on consumer credit by credit institutions according to the latest statistics of the 
Estonian Central Bank.*71
The matter of the burden of proof under the new rule was initially not clear, however. A view was 
expressed in the literature that if the APRC of a credit agreement exceeds three time the average APRC, it 
is presumably void and it is for the creditor to prove the opposite—i.e., not having known or been required 
to have known of the existence of gross disparity.*72 Such a burden of proof would have been fairly compli-
cated for the creditor to meet, as it would have meant the proof of absence of a circumstance. Therefore, the 
Estonian Chancellor of Justice went so far as to take the position that §86 of the GPCCA might violate the 
fundamental freedom of free entrepreneurship guaranteed by the Estonian Constitution.*73 The issue was 
fi nally clarifi ed in 2011 in Supreme Court case 3-2-1-49-11. The Supreme Court stated that, for the credit 
contract to be held to be against ‘good morals’ and, accordingly, void under §86 of the GPCCA, it has to be 
ascertained, fi rstly, whether there is a gross imbalance in value in the mutual obligations of the parties and, 
secondly, whether the consumer concluded the contract in consequence of his or her urgent needs, depen-
dence, or inexperience.*74 Most importantly, the Supreme Court stressed that it is the consumer who has 
to plead and prove the existence of the second of these elements, i.e. that he or she concluded the contract 
due to gross disparity.*75
Such division of the burden of proof means that §86 of the GPCCA, providing for the voidness of a usu-
rious credit contract, cannot be applied ex offi cio by the court, particularly if the consumer is not present in 
the proceedings, which is often the case is Estonia.*76 This is probably one of the most important reasons 
for which the unconscionability doctrine has proved to be ineffective against the usurious practices. The fact 
that it is the consumer who must plead and prove that he or she concluded the credit contract due to urgent 
needs or inexperience has created a situation in which there are practically no cases wherein the voidness 
of a usurious credit contract has been established by the court.*77 It is interesting to note, however, that in a 
judgement of the Tallinn District Court the court held that asserting claims arising from a consumer-credit 
contract with an APRC of 441% is not compatible with the principle of good faith.*78 The court explicitly did 
not apply the unconscionability doctrine of §86 of the GPCCA, although the arguments put forward in the 
judgement were, in fact, essentially the same as what can frequently be found in assessment as to the usuri-
ous nature of a credit contract. The court was probably trying to avoid the problem of the consumer having 
not established the existence of gross disparity and, rather, applying the principle of good faith, which could 
be applied ex offi cio and without any issues of the burden of proof.
One of the further reasons for which §86 of the GPCCA is very seldom applied in the case law is that 
usurious consumer-credit contracts are often enforced not in ordinary court proceedings but through the 
use of debt-collection agencies. This has psychological background as consumers tend to pay voluntarily 
after receiving a payment reminder from the debt collectors.*79 Firstly, they are not sure of their legal 
rights and often fi nd the pressure from the agency intimidating. Secondly, many of them are afraid of the 
71 As of 1 March 2014, the annual interest rate published by the Bank of Estonia for short-term credit (granted in Estonian 
kroons) (at http://www.eestipank.info/) was 33.96%. As a result, the contractual APRC is deemed to be contrary to good 
morals if it amounts to more than about 100%.
72 K. Saare et al. Laenusaaja õiguste kaitse SMS-laenulepingute puhul [‘Protection of consumers in SMS loan agreements’]. – 
Juridica 2010/1, p. 47 (in Estonian).
73 For further information on this issue, see the work of I. Ulst (see Note 18), pp. 44–77.
74 CCSCd 17.06.2011 3-2-1-49-11, paragraph 8 (in Estonian).
75 Ibid., paragraph 9. The standard of proof may be lower, however, in those cases in which the disproportion between the 
parties’ obligations is extreme.
76 For more information, see K. Sein (see Note 62), p. 34, along with I. Ulst (see Note 18), p. 75.
77 M. Vutt. Tehingu heade kommete vastasus TSÜS § 86 alusel [‘Transactions contrary to good morals under §86 of the GPCCA’], 
pp. 6−18, 25−26. Available at http://www.riigikohus.ee/vfs/1352/TehinguHeadeKommeteVastasus_MargitVutt.pdf (most 
recently accessed on 3.4.2013) (in Estonian). See also K. Sein (see Note 62), p. 34. 
78 Judgement of the Tallinn District Court 2-11-60438, of 3.1.2012 (in Estonian).
79 K. Sein (see Note 62), p. 34.
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creditor reporting their default to the credit information registry, which would result in their stigmatisation 
throughout the credit market. 
The ordinary court proceedings are avoided also through the use of the order-for-payment procedure. If 
the creditor uses this procedure and the defaulting consumer does not fi le a timely statement of opposition 
to the claim, the court issues a payment order in accordance with §489 of the Civil Procedure Code. Such 
a payment order can be enforced without any other formalities, and thereby the creditor can avoid assess-
ment of the validity of the claim by a court. The fact that the interests of consumers are not adequately pro-
tected in the order-for-payment procedure has been repeatedly stressed in the Estonian legal literature.*80 
It is also the Estonian reality that most debtors in cases of usurious consumer loans tend to be persons 
who are not ready to assert their rights in the courts. Their situation is further complicated by the fact that 
consumer-credit norms are highly complex and consumers are, as a rule, not able to resort to them*81, at 
least not without professional legal aid.
The norms banning usurious contracts have further been avoided via use of abstract acknowledgements 
of debt. It is common practice in Estonia that when a consumer defaults, the creditor (or the debt-collection 
agency hired by the creditor) offers him or her the option of signing an abstract acknowledgement of debt 
according to which the consumer acknowledges owing the creditor a certain sum of money. In other words, 
the capital of the debt, the interest, penalty interest, and other costs of the initial contract are added together 
and constitute the new capital owed under the acknowledgement of debt.*82 These acknowledge ments of 
debt are then enforced either in the order-for-payment procedure or in ordinary court proceedings, which 
makes it impossible or at least very diffi cult to determine whether the underlying credit contract could be 
considered usurious and therefore void under §86 of the GPCCA.
All in all, one can draw the conclusion that in reality the unconscionability doctrine and the relative 
APRC restrictions in §86 of the GPCCA have not fulfi lled their purpose of effectively limiting the usurious 
practices of electronic-consumer-loan providers. The same view has been expressed by the Estonian Con-
sumer Protection Board.*83 Therefore, a plea has been made in the legal literature to abandon the uncon-
scionability doctrine and to introduce APRC caps in its place.*84 Not all Estonian legal scholars favour 
APRC restrictions, though. Instead of limitations to the cost of credit and stricter information, disclosure, 
and prudent marketing requirements are proposed by I. Ulst in her doctoral thesis.*85 She also doubts the 
constitutionality of APRC or interest-rate restrictions, asserting that ‘the APRC limit disproportionately 
restricts the constitutionally protected right of entrepreneurship freedom of service providers. In weighing 
the proportionality of the restriction, an important issue is the confl ict between the principle of social state 
and the fundamental right of entrepreneurship freedom’.*86
This far, the Estonian legislator has been unwilling to introduce APRC or interest-rate caps*87 and 
has instead favoured milder measures such as advertising restrictions or more detailed requirements for 
responsible lending. As the problem persisted, very recently the Supreme Court intervened and stated that 
the legislator should foresee APRC caps as a more effi cient consumer-protection measure.*88 In the same 
decision, the Supreme Court partly amended its earlier position, ruling that if the APRC is more than six 
times the average market consumer-credit APRC, the consumer-credit agreement is presumably in viola-
tion of good morals and should, on that basis, be considered void.*89 At the end of March 2014, the Ministry 
80 K. Saare et al. (see Note 71), p. 49; M. Vutt (see Note 76), p. 6; V. Kõve. Tsiviilkohtumenetluse kiirendamise võimalused ja 
nendega seotud ohud [‘Possibilities for expediting civil proceedings and dangers thereof’]. – Juridica 2012/9, pp. 670–671 
(in Estonian); K. Sein (see Note 62), pp. 34–35, 39–40.
81 V. Kõve (see Note 79), p. 668.
82 J. Ots. Intressilt viivise arvutamise keeld [Prohibition of calculating penalty interest on interest’]. – Juridica 2010/2, p. 422 
(in Estonian).
83 Tarbijakaitseamet (Consumer Protection Board). Tarbijakaitseameti aastaaruanne 2010 [‘Yearbook of the Consumer Pro-
tection Board 2010’], p. 55. Available at http://www.tarbijakaitseamet.ee/public/Aastaaruanne_2010.pdf (most recently 
accessed on 11.4.2013) (in Estonian).
84 K. Sein (see Note 62), pp. 35–36.
85 I. Ulst (see Note 18), p. 81. Other authors, however, are of the opinion that the regulation of APRC limits is justifi ed for 
protection of consumers, especially in consideration of the fact that in various European countries similar or even more 
restrictive interest limits exist; see K. Saareet al. (see Note 71), pp. 141–142.
86 I. Ulst (see Note 18), p. 79.
87 A proposal for a legislative amendment presented by the opposition party to Parliament was rejected in September 2013.
88 CCSCd 5.03.2014, 3-2-1-186-13, paragraph 25 (in Estonian).
89 Ibid., paragraph 22.
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of Justice presented a draft for introduction of APRC caps, which would add a new §4062 to the Law of 
Obligations Act. According to the newly drafted §4062 of the LOA, a consumer-credit agreement would be 
void if its APRC exceeds triply the average APRC for consumer credit according to the latest statistics of the 
Estonian Central Bank. At the time of completion of this article, the draft has not yet been adopted, but if it 
does enter the law, it would probably mean a considerable reduction in usurious credit practices in Estonia.
5.2. Civil law sanctions for breaching the principle 
of responsible lending
In addition to the sanctions in administrative law, breach of the principle of responsible lending can have 
civil-law consequences in Estonia. Firstly, it has to be stressed that such breach does not render the credit 
agreement void.*90 But a creditor who is in breach of the responsible lending obligation may be liable for 
damages calculated on the basis of reliance interest. In late 2012, the Estonian Supreme Court stated that 
the obligation of the creditor to assess the creditworthiness of the borrower constitutes a pre-contractual 
obligation under §14 (1) of the LOA, according to which persons engaged in pre-contractual negotiations or 
other preparations for entering into a contract shall take reasonable account of one another’s interests and 
rights.*91 If the creditor breaches this pre-contractual obligation, the borrower—and also the person who 
has given a surety for the borrower—may have a right to damages under Sections 14 and 115 of the LOA. 
The amount of damages should be assessed on the basis of the negative interest. The borrower should be 
thus compensated for all negative consequences of the credit—the Supreme Court explicitly names interest 
for late payment, penalty for breach of contract, and decrease in assets—and can offset the associated claim 
for damages with the repayment claim of the creditor.*92 Whether the contractual interest should also be 
considered worthy of compensation as damages is less clear, but the question should still be answered in 
the affi rmative.*93
It is yet to be decided in court practice whether breach of the responsible lending obligation can also 
lead to the avoidability (due to mistake or fraud) of the credit contract.*94 Most probably, this should be 
possible. In 2013, the Tallinn District Court established the legality of avoidance of a mortgage agreement 
by reason of fraud of the creditor under §95 of the GPCCA.*95 The court held that the failure of the creditor 
to assess the creditworthiness of the borrower constituted fraud in the circumstances of the case—the credi-
tor was aware of the over-indebtedness of the borrower—and entitled the mortgagor to avoid the mortgage 
agreement. The creditor tried to bring the case to the Supreme Court but failed: the Supreme Court decided 
not to hear the case. The refusal of the Supreme Court to decide on that case indicates that the Tallinn 
District Court had applied the substantive law correctly: breach of the responsible lending obligation can 
indeed lead to the avoidance (on account of fraud) of a mortgage agreement.*96 But if the avoidance of a 
mortgage or suretyship agreement is held to be possible (there has even been talk of the principle of respon-
sible surety-taking to go along with the principle of responsible lending), the same should apply to the pos-
sibility of avoidance of the credit contract in the fi rst place.
All in all, the civil-law sanctions for breaching the responsible lending obligation can be described as 
relatively far-reaching under Estonian law: the consumer is, in principle, entitled to avoid the credit con-
tract and claim damages for reliance interest. Further, the legislative amendment of §4032 (7) of the LOA 
dating from 1 July 2013 clarifi ed the issue of the burden of proof, specifying that it is the creditor who has to 
prove having complied with the responsible lending obligations. It is yet to be seen, however, whether those 
private-law sanctions will prove to be effective in case law or whether their application will be impeded 
by procedural issues. Thus far, we have found only one judgement in which a court has actually held the 
90 CCSCd 19.02.2014 3-2-1-169-13, paragraph 18 (in Estonian).
91 CCSCd 27.11.2012 3-2-1-136-12, paragraph 24 (in Estonian).
92 Ibid., paragraph 25 (in Estonian). 
93 In the legal literature this was held to be possible already in 2007, before the adoption and implementation of the CCD. See 
P. Varul et al. (see Note 67), p. 383.
94 See also K. Sein. Transposition of the new Consumer Credit Directive in Estonia. – European Review of Private Law 2012/2, 
pp. 439–440.
95 Judgement of the Tallinn District Court 2-10-48441, of 30.5.2013.
96 The Supreme Court has also held that the avoidance of a personal suretyship agreement for reasons of fraud or mistake is 
possible; see CCSCd 27.11.2012 3-2-1-136-12, paragraph 26. 
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creditor to be in breach of the responsible lending obligation.*97 In all other civil cases wherein the issue was 
considered, the court held that there was no breach of responsible lending, in some cases even stressing that 
the borrower must be able to assess his or her own creditworthiness.*98
5.3. Party autonomy restrictions: Interest for late payment 
and claims for damages
5.3.1. Interest for late payment
The Estonian legislator and the Supreme Court have tried to improve the position of the consumer by 
restricting party autonomy in several respects. Mostly, the restrictions on party autonomy are related to 
interest for late payment and a creditor’s claim for damages. Some of the restrictions apply to standard 
terms only, but most of them are relevant also for individually negotiated contracts.
When the consumer is in default on payment, the creditor is entitled to claim interest for late payment 
under §113 of the LOA. At fi rst, after the passing of the LOA in 2002, there was no unanimity in views as to 
whether the creditor may demand interest plus penalty interest in the event of the consumer’s default. The 
clarifi cation came with the judgements of the Supreme Court ruling that the contractual interest can only 
be claimed until the sum for repayment is due—i.e., only for the time that was originally agreed upon for the 
use of the creditor’s money. If the loan or part thereof is not repaid in time, from this point on the creditor 
is only entitled to interest for late payment and, as the case may be, for additional damages resulting from 
the delay. Thus the general rule under Estonian law is that interest for late payment cannot be claimed in 
combination with contractual interest for the time of default on repayment of the loan.*99 This rule is, in 
principle, dispositive in nature, so the parties can agree in the contract that the lender is entitled to claim 
the contractual interest alongside interest for late payment.*100 The party autonomy ends, however, at the 
point when the creditor has withdrawn from the contract because of the consumer’s default: on account 
of the mandatory provisions of §416 (3) of the LOA, the creditor is then only entitled to interest for late 
payment and cannot claim the lost contractual interest as damages.*101 All in all, the general rule under 
Estonian law is that in the case of default, the creditor may claim—in addition to specifi c performance—only 
interest for late payment.
The restrictions place great weight on how the rate of interest for late payment is calculated. Usually, it 
is stipulated in the credit contract. Here again, party autonomy is somewhat restricted: according to §415 
(1) of the LOA, the rate of interest for late payment in consumer-credit agreements may not exceed the 
statutory rate provided for in §113 (1) of the LOA. This too has created some controversy in past case law, as 
§113 (1) of the LOA actually covers two methods for calculating the statutory interest rate for late payment. 
According to the fi rst sentence of §113 (1) of the LOA, the statutory penalty rate is calculated by adding eight 
per cent to the statutory interest rate specifi ed in §94 of the LOA.*102 For credit agreements, an alternative 
calculation method is provided for in the third sentence of §113 of the LOA: if a contractual interest rate 
exceeds the statutory rate of interest for late payment, then the contractual interest rate constitutes the rate 
of interest for late payment. Therefore, if the contractual interest rate as of today exceeds 8.25%, the con-
tractual interest rate will be applied as the rate of interest for late payment.*103
97 Judgement of Pärnu County Court 2-10-51549, of 7.6.2013. The Supreme Court found the creditor in breach of the responsible 
lending obligation also in case 3-2-1-169-13 but dismissed that argument due to procedural reasons. 
98 See, for example, Harju County Court judgements 2-12-32459, of 22.4.2013, and 2-12-22941, of 28.2.2013.
99 CCSCd 29.01.2007 3-2-1-137-06, paragraph 17 (in Estonian); CCSCd 5.11.20018 3-2-1-89-08, paragraph 15 (in Estonian).
100 P. Varul et al. (see Note 67), p. 394.
101 CCSCd 14.01.2009 3-2-1-120-08, paragraph 11 (in Estonian).
102 According to Section 94 (1) of the LOA, the interest rate shall be applied on a half-year basis and shall be equal to the last 
interest rate applicable to the main refi nancing operations of the European Central Bank before 1 January or 1 July of the 
year, unless the law or the contract provides otherwise. The statutory interest rate referred to in Section 94 of the LOA is 
published on the Web site of the Estonian Central Bank at http://www.eestipank.ee/pub/en/yldine/ekp/ and may change 
every six months.
103 This was affi rmed in Supreme Court judgement 14.01.2009 3-2-1-120-08, paragraph 12.
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There is a further restriction on claiming interest for late payment; according to the mandatory §113 (6) 
of the LOA, no interest for late payment may be claimed for delay in the payment of interest.*104While this 
does not preclude or restrict the right of the creditor to claim compensation for damage caused by a delay 
in the payment of interest (see the LOA’s §113 (7) and §415 (1), second sentence), here the creditor bears the 
burden of proof as to the existence and amount of his or her damages. And, as we saw earlier, the Supreme 
Court does not allow the creditor to claim lost contractual interest as damages.*105
Since the fi nancial crisis in 2008, disputes on so-called refi nancing agreements have become common. 
Refi nancing agreements are usually concluded in a situation wherein the consumer is not able to pay back 
the original loan and his or her unpaid debts under the original credit agreement are ‘refi nanced’; i.e., the 
payment period is extended. It is common practice that in this situation the unpaid interest (and sometimes 
also the accrued interest for late payment) is capitalised; i.e., it is added to the capital of the loan. Thus, 
under the refi nancing agreement, the consumer is obliged to pay interest also on the interest accrued under 
the original credit contract.
Controversy has arisen in case law as to whether such a refi nancing agreement constitutes a new credit 
agreement or should be viewed only as an agreement to change the original credit agreement (to extend 
the payment period). There was also no common view on whether the practice of capitalising the interest is 
legal or not. This issue was cleared up by the very recent Supreme Court judgement 3-2-1-169-13. Here, the 
Supreme Court stated that the legal nature of such agreements should be evaluated on the basis of their eco-
nomic content and that they should rather be considered modifi cation of the original loan agreement.*106 
Secondly, the Supreme Court considered capitalisation of interest (including interest for late payment) 
unacceptable: such practice is contrary to the prohibition expressed in §113 (6) of the LOA.*107 The Supreme 
Court emphasised that this provision shall not be avoided merely by replacing one agreement with another. 
Accordingly, it is only allowed to calculate the agreed interest and interest for late payment on the original 
capital of the loan.*108
Estonian law also entitles the court to reduce the interest for late payment: according to §113 (8) of the 
LOA, a person required to pay interest for late payment may claim for a reduction of the fi ne pursuant to the 
provisions of §162 of the LOA.*109 However, the court may not do so on its own initiative; the debtor must 
so request.*110 When deciding upon reduction, the court must consider circumstances such as the extent to 
which the obligation has been performed by the debtor, the legitimate interests of the creditor, and the eco-
nomic situation of the parties (see §162 (1) of the LOA). If the amount of interest for late payment exceeds 
the capital of the claim, then the creditor has to prove having suffered loss in a larger amount.*111
As we have seen, claims for interest for late payment are restricted in several ways in Estonian law: 
fi rstly, when agreeing upon its rate, the parties must follow the restrictions of §415 (1) of the LOA; sec-
ondly, the creditor may not claim contractual interest in parallel with the interest for late payment; thirdly, 
no interest for late payment may be claimed for delay in the payment of interest; and, fi nally, the court is 
entitled to reduce the interest for late payment if the consumer so requests.
5.3.2. Contractual penalties and claims for damages 
Restrictions to party autonomy exist also with respect to liquidated damages claims and contractual penal-
ties. The lead here has been taken by the Supreme Court, who have acknowledged the dangers associated 
with absolute party autonomy and declared void several abusive clauses in consumer-credit contracts. At 
104 This has been criticised by P. Varul et al. See Võlaõigusseadus I. Kommenteeritud väljaanne [‘Law of Obligations Act I: 
Commented Edition’]. Tallinn: Juura 2006, p. 382; J. Ots (see Note 81), pp. 418–426. In 2009, the Ministry of Justice even 
presented a draft for elimination of this restriction. However, in the time of fi nancial recession this was politically undesir-
able, and the law has remained unchanged thus far.
105 CCSCd 14.01.2009 3-2-1-120-08, paragraph 11.
106 CCSCd 19.02.2014 3-2-1-169-13, paragraph 17 (in Estonian).
107 Ibid., paragraphs 28–30.
108 Ibid., paragraph 29.
109 The court may also reduce the statutory interest for late payment calculated in accordance with the third sentence of Section 
113 (1) of the LOA. See CCSCd 3-2-1-120-08 (see Note 98), paragraph 12.
110 P. Varul et al. (see Note 103), p. 383; CCSCd 14.06.2005 3-2-1-66-05, paragraph 15 (in Estonian).
111 CCSCd 14.06.2005 3-2-1-66-05, paragraph 18.
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least once, the position taken by the Supreme Court has brought about amendments to the Law of Obliga-
tions Act. Namely, before 2008, it was common practice for creditors offering usurious electronic consumer 
credit to provide for a contractual penalty for late payment and for this to be claimed in addition to the 
interest on late payment.*112 In 2008, such clauses were declared void by the Supreme Court in case 3-2-1-
120-08 as being contrary to the mandatory provisions of the consumer-credit contract law (§§ 416 and 421 
of the LOA).*113 After this judgement, in 2011, a provision was added to the LOA precluding such contract 
terms: according to the new third sentence of §415 (1) of the LOA, agreements that allow claiming payment 
of earnest money or a contractual penalty from the consumer in the event of late payments are void. 
Very often, the position of consumers who are in default is worsened by the high debt-collection and 
payment-reminder fees that they are bound to pay under the standard terms of the creditors. In the above-
mentioned groundbreaking case, 3-2-1-120-08, the Supreme Court tried to stop the practice of creditors 
charging unreasonably high fees for debt collection and payment reminders as liquidated damages. The 
Supreme Court ruled that clauses according to which consumers have to compensate for debt-collection 
and payment-reminder fees as fi xed in the standard terms of the creditor can be deemed unfair under §42 
(3), item 5 of the LOA if they are unreasonably high.*114 However, there remains no common understand-
ing in the case law of when such collection costs can be considered unreasonably high and the clauses, for 
this reason, void.*115 One can fi nd decisions wherein the courts have found such costs to be unreasonably 
high and, accordingly, unfair, with the consequence that the consumer does not have to bear them or has to 
compensate for them to only a reduced extent.*116 In the majority of the cases, however, courts have held the 
clauses to be valid, ordering the consumers to pay relatively large amounts of collections costs.*117
The absence of uniform case law on debt-collection fees stems from the fact that Estonian law does not 
provide for clear criteria in decisions on the possible unfairness of the liquidated-damages clauses pertain-
ing to debt-collection fees. Therefore, there has been discussion of whether one should follow the example 
of several European countries (such as the Nordic countries or Holland) where maximum amounts of debt-
collection costs are specifi ed by law. The Ministry of Justice has done preliminary research on the issue 
and put forward a proposal to the legislature, but this proposal has not yet been adopted by the Parliament. 
6. Penal measures
There are no measures in penal law in the Estonian law that could be applied in cases of usurious credit con-
tracts or of breach of the responsible lending obligation. Usury is not considered a criminal offence under 
the Estonian Penal Code.
7. Conclusions
Instant loans are a fairly new phenomenon in the Estonian credit market. Regardless of the absence of sta-
tistical data of any precision, it is obvious that the problem of over-indebtedness is a very topical question.
Instant-loan providers are currently neither supervised by the Financial Supervision Authority in Esto-
nia nor subject to a licensing system. Therefore, there are no offi cial statistics on the exact number of bor-
rowers; one can provide only some estimates. The market share of electronic retail lenders is about 16% of 
112 K. Sein (see Note 62), p. 38.
113 CCSCd 14.01.2009 3-2-1-120-08, paragraph 15.
114 Ibid.
115 K. Saare, K. Sein. Amtsermittlungspfl icht der nationalen Gerichte bei der Kontrolle von missbräuchlichen Klauseln in Ver-
braucherverträgen [‘Obligation of national courts to act ex offi cio by unfair terms control in consumer contracts’]. – Zeitschrift 
für Europäisches Unternehmens- und Verbraucherrecht 2013/1, p. 24 (in German).
116 E.g., Tartu County Court decisions 2-08-14356 and 2-11-19661, wherein the Court considered 3,100-kroon (approx. 199 EUR) 
and 166.14 EUR debt-collection fees to be unreasonably high. Collection costs of 126 EUR were deemed unreasonably high 
also in a recent decision of Pärnu County Court (2-13-765, of 13.9.2013).
117 See, for example, decision of Harju County Court 2-07-3204, in which the creditor was awarded EUR 86.92 in debt-collection 
fees.
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the whole retail lending market. However, according to various assessments, there might be approximately 
100,000 customers of instant-loan providers, with their number continuously growing.
Estonian law provides some specifi c restrictions on advertising of fi nancial services and some general 
requirements for marketing that have an impact on the instant-loan market. In 2013, the legislator set 
forth additional requirements in relation to advertising of fi nancial services. Also, the responsible lending 
principle and expanded information obligations were added in the transposition of the EU Consumer Credit 
Directive. In addition to the administrative-law sanctions, breach of the principle of responsible lending can 
have civil-law consequences in Estonia—loan providers may be liable for damages calculated on the basis 
of reliance interest.
Debt-counselling as a social service is not generally available in Estonia. However, there is access to 
some privately organised debt-counselling systems. Only a privately held negative credit register exists in 
Estonia, but there is some discussion of the possibility of introducing a positive credit register.
In 2009, the Estonian legislator attempted to solve the problems arising out of usurious practices of 
instant-loan providers by means of a legislative amendment setting forth a relative APRC cap in combina-
tion with the unconscionability doctrine. In reality, the latter doctrine and the relative APRC restrictions 
have not fulfi lled their purpose of effectively limiting the usurious practices of electronic-consumer-loan 
providers. Thus far, the Estonian legislator has been unwilling to introduce APRC or interest-rate caps. 
Rather, it has favoured lighter measures such as advertising restrictions or more detailed requirements for 
responsible lending. With the problem not having gone away, very recently a draft was presented by the 
Estonian Ministry of Justice with proposed introduction of an APRC cap, which should be triply the mar-
ket average APRC. Should this proposal be accepted, it might lead to a considerable reduction in usurious 
credit practices in Estonia. Its effectiveness might, on the other hand, be reduced in consequence of use of 
the order-for-payment procedure remaining possible for consumer credit regardless of the APRC of a given 
contract. Other positive developments are the proposals for specifi ed ceilings to debt-collection costs, for 
introducing licensing requirements for creditors and for additional restrictions on advertising.
